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THE DEREGULATORY VALENCE OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S FEDERALISM
Bradley W. Joondeph* In a series of highly publicized decisions, the Rehnquist Court reinvigorated several federalism-based doctrines that constrain the national government, narrowing the breadth of Congress's legislative powers and expanding the states' immunity from federal regulation and from suits for damages. In terms of practical consequences, these decisions may have been more symbolic' than revolutionary, 2 but the Court clearly revived the salience of federalism as a principle of constitutional law.
the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Import-Export Clause, the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, and, most significantly, the doctrine of preemption-O'Connor's voting record lacked a similar dedication to protecting the states' policymaking autonomy. In these cases, she essentially voted no differently than the average justice with whom she served.
This Article presents a statistical study of Justice O'Connor's voting record in the full universe of federalism decisions during her tenure on the Court, demonstrating that her approach to federalism was more complicated than most observers have appreciated. The study suggests that O'Connor's reputation as an ardent proponent of state autonomy needs to be tempered, for it is only accurate with respect to disputes about the powers of the national government. If we expand our definition of federalism to include those disputes that involved the Constitution's structural limits on state power, O'Connor's dedication to state autonomy seems relatively tepid. In fact, an equally prominent themeespecially during her last eleven full terms on the Court-is that she tended to disfavor government regulation of any sort, whether it emanated from Congress or the states. This is not to say that Justice O'Connor's voting behavior was normatively or jurisprudentially inconsistent; there may well have been principled, legal justifications for favoring state policymaking autonomy in one context but not the other. Nor is it to suggest that she consciously used the faqade of federalism to accommodate a political preference for less regulation. There is no reason to believe that she did not subscribe to the rationales expressed in her opinions or those that she joined, and, regardless, the nature of human decisionmaking is such that the "true" reasons for a decision are usually unknowable, especially to the decisionmaker herself. 13 Rather, the point is strictly descriptive: in the full universe of decisions involving the constitutional boundaries between federal and state power, O'Connor was comparatively protective of state autonomy only in cases addressing the limits on national authority.
13.
See ZIvA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 3 (1999) (describing how people tend to arrive at decisions that they are motivated to reach while being unaware of that motivation's influence); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. AGENDA 8, 8 (2001) 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II briefly describes the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival and Justice O'Connor's role in that project. Part III explains that, given the breadth of Congress's modern regulatory authority, the latitude afforded state governments in areas of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction may actually be more important to the values of federalism than enforcing the outer limits of congressional power. Thus, to gain a complete understanding of a justice's attitude towards constitutional federalism, we need to review those cases implicating the structural provisions that constrain the states, not just those involving the limits on the national government. Part IV summarizes Justice O'Connor's voting record in the entire universe of federalism cases, so defined, comparing her votes to those of the justices with whom she served. Finally, Part V offers some observations about the study's results. Most interestingly, they show that O'Connor voted to limit regulation as frequently as she voted to enhance state autonomy. In other words, across the full run of federalism cases, O'Connor was as much a proponent of reducing government regulation as she was of enhancing state autonomy.
II. THE FEDERALISM "REVIVAL"
This much is not news: the Rehnquist Court reshaped the constitutional rules governing the respective roles of the national government and the states in our federal republic. 4 The Court 14.
The thoughtful and perceptive commentary on the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence is far too voluminous to cite in its entirety. Here is just a sampling: LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (2001) S. 144, 188 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (commenting on the "anticommandeering" principle set forth in the Court's opinion)).
18.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) . 19.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (ruling that CERCLA allows the states to be sued in federal courts and noting that Congress can subject the states to liability when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
20. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757-60 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to subject the states to private, unconsenting suits for damages in state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
21. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) . Perhaps as notably, in fashioning these doctrinal innovations, the Court has asserted itself as the ultimate arbiter of questions concerning the breadth of Congress's power vis-A-vis the states, invalidating national legislation on federalism grounds at a rate unseen in several generations. See, e.g., David Franklin, Marijuana and Judicial Modesty, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 2005 , at 27 (commenting that, through a series of recent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed its role as the sole interpreter of the Constitution); Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2000 , at 39, 42-43 (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000 ) (observing that between 1995 and 2000 the Court struck down twenty-five federal laws on grounds of federalism or separation of powers, yet between 1941 and 1995 not a single federal law was found unconstitutional for exceeding Congress's ability to control interstate commerce).
Aside from these constitutional rulings, the Rehnquist Court also invoked federalism principles in several cases of statutory interpretation to limit the encroachment of federal regulation on the states themselves or into areas historically regulated by the states alone. For instance, in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) , the Court stated that when "Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." ' Id. at 65 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ). It therefore held that neither a state nor its officials, when acting in their official capacities, were "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 71. Similarly, the Court held in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) , that a private individual could not bring a qui tam action against a state under the False Claims Act because the states are not "persons" subject to suit under the Act. Id. at 787. Alluding to "the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions," the Court noted that "there is 'a serious doubt"' as to "whether an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. " Id.; Perhaps most significantly, the Rehnquist Court did nothing to trim Congress's authority under the Spending Clause, leaving Congress the ability to circumvent most of these constraints by enacting conditional spending legislation aimed at the states. 26 Still, even if the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions did not constitute a "federalism revolution," they seem to have done something. It is now clear, as it was not before 1995, that there are judicially enforceable limits on Congress's commerce power, particularly with respect to activities that have historically been regulated by the states. 2 7 Congress's capacity to enact legislation to enforce the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment has been narrowed, such that any legislative effort to enforce a constitutional right or to protect a class of citizens that the Court has not deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny is hold that the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), does not apply to owner-occupied residences that have not been used for any commercial purpose).
22. 44, 72-73 (1996) . 30. See TUSHNET, supra note 14, at 320-29 (suggesting several areas in which a conservative court might transform the understanding of constitutional law).
31. See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2004 Conceivably, though much less likely, it could hold that most federal antidiscrimination legislation is beyond Congress's commerce power because the regulated activity of discrimination-whether based on race, gender, religion, age, or disability-is not "economic" or "commercial" in nature. 34 Whatever the ultimate significance of the Rehnquist Court's federalism project, the conventional wisdom seems to be that O'Connor played a central role in its development. When O'Connor announced her retirement in July 2005, assessments of her legacy teemed with references to her views on the balance between federal and state power. In its tribute, the New York Times editorial page mentioned "her strong support for federalism," and that "[slhe was fiercely protective of states' rights."" Nina Totenberg observed that O'Connor "became part of a conservative states-rights majority," 3 6 while Linda Greenhouse wrote that she had been "a loyal ally" of Rehnquist "in the [C]ourt's continuing reappraisal of the relationship between the states and the federal government." 37 Academics echoed these views. A.E. Dick Howard said that "it was O'Connor as much as Rehnquist ... who revived the doctrine of states' rights,"" while John Yoo commented that O'Connor's "signature issue,... that historians will look back on, is that she really was the person who helped bring about and restore states' rights and more of a balance of powers between the federal government and the state governments." 39 44 Moreover, in addition to authoring some of the more significant opinions in the federalism revival, 4 O'Connor used her opinions to advance fairly deep theoretical justifications for federalism as an abiding constitutional principle-deeper than she tended to develop in other contexts. In her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi, for instance, O'Connor contended that "the 50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas," citing the examples of women's suffrage, unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, nofault auto insurance, and environmental protection. 6 She also argued that "federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government," and explained that "[ciitizens... cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals formulated by a faraway national legislature." 47 Finally, she posited that "our federal system provides a salutary check on governmental power," noting that "[u]nless we zealously protect these" divisions of authority, "we risk upsetting the balance of power that buttresses our basic liberties." 4 8 Or, as she wrote in Gregory v. Ashcroft, "U]ust as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." 49 In short, there is much to be said for the conventional view of O'Connor as a strong defender of state autonomy. But the decisions on which these perceptions seem to be based all addressed the Constitution's structural limits on the national government. From New York to Lopez to Garrett to Raich, the issue was whether Congress had exceeded its enumerated powers, and thus impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty.'o But, as explained further below, federalism is a two-way street. It is as much about the structural limits on the states as those on the national government."' Thus, a conception of federalism that 46. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47.
Id. at 789-90.
48.
Id. at 790.
49.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
50.
See Gonzales focuses solely on the breadth of Congress's authority is unduly narrow, for it ignores the degree to which states can, or cannot, exercise policymaking autonomy in areas of concurrent federal and state regulatory jurisdiction-which is to say, most areas of modern American life. 5 " To gain a more complete picture, we need to widen the lens of federalism, the point to which I now turn.
III. A BROADER CONCEPTION OF FEDERALISM
In its plainest terms, federalism is a system of governance in which two distinct governments simultaneously exercise sovereignty over the same population and geographic territory. It implies a constitutionalized division of power between these two centers of authority-between the national and state governments-with neither fully answerable to the other, each independent sovereigns in certain respects, yet all part of one nation. 53 For this division of power to work in practice, there must be rules that delineate the respective roles of the national and state governments. These rules need not necessarily be enforced by the courts, nor must they be formally codified. But for a system of government to be accurately characterized as federal, such rules must exist in one form or another. 54 52. See generally Fallon, supra note 14, at 431-33 (theorizing that the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revival" can be categorized into three prominent lines, each of them focusing on congressional authority rather than protections afforded to the states); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 511-12 (2002) (arguing the importance of ensuring that Congress has indeed focused upon the displacement of state authority before legislating a preemptive federal law); Young, supra note 14, at 130-34 ("The first priority of federalism doctrine ought to be limiting the preemptive impact of federal law on state regulation. Stressing preemption shifts the focus firmly back onto what state governments do.").
53. See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of political and legal powers between two systems of government constituting a single Nation.").
54. It is worth noting that federalism has no particular ideological valence. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1307-08 (writing that "states' rights arguments are not inherently ideological"). Although it has generally been associated with conservative political causes over the course of American history, that has not always been the case. Indeed, recent issues-such as the medicinal use of marijuana, physician-assisted suicide, and gay marriage, not to mention the presidential election dispute in Florida in 2000-have all involved circumstances in which progressive political causes have embraced the principle of state policymaking autonomy. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist Perspective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 719, 723 (2003) (questioning the "soundness of conventionally progressive opposition to federalism and local control"). Nor does the concept of federalism, in itself, dictate a specific balance of power between the national government and the states. Of course, for a system of federalism to be truly federalist, both centers of government must have some independent existence. But beyond that minimum, authentically federal systems can differ quite dramatically in the relative strengths of the national government and the states. See Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593 REV. , 1593 REV. , 1599 More to the point, these rules must limit both centers of power, not just the national government. While an unconstrained national government could potentially swallow up the independent existence of the states-a point the Rehnquist Court repeatedly emphasized-so, too, might the states act in ways that would effectively destroy the Union. 55 Indeed, problems of this sort under the Articles of Confederation, especially in commercial matters, were largely why the Constitution came into being. 56 A principal defect of the Articles was that they did little to prevent the states from acting in self-interested ways that undermined the interests of the nation as a whole. States imposed various barriers to interstate commerce, such as protective tariffs on goods from other states; they often failed to comply with the Continental Congress's requisitions, the chief mechanism for funding the federal government; they encroached on the federal government's authority, such as by entering into compacts with each other and signing their own treaties with Indian tribes; and they disregarded international agreements that the federal government had reached with other nations." In the words of James Madison, the states had a "centrifugal tendency" to "fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order [and] harmony of the political system." 58 A chief purpose of the Constitution, then, was to create a "[flirm Union" that would preserve "the peace and liberty of the States" 5 9 -to reduce "[tihe interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States" that had 1606 ("Federalism is not a single type of system, but a family of disparate systems."). become "injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy." 0 Structural limits on the powers of state governments are, thus, a central aspect of American federalism. And those limits, manifested in several distinct constitutional provisions and doctrines, remain critical elements of our governmental structure. 61 The Supremacy Clause, through the doctrine of preemption, dictates that validly enacted federal laws shall negate any state laws with which they conflict. 62 The Dormant Commerce Clause generally nullifies state laws that discriminate against, or place undue burdens on, interstate commerce. 6 3 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV forbids states from discriminating against the citizens of other states unless there is a substantial reason for doing so and the discrimination is substantially related to that justification. 64 The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity prohibits states from directly regulating the federal government or enacting laws that discriminate against the federal government's interests. 6 5 And the Import-Export and Duty of Tonnage Clauses impose specific constraints on the states' taxing powers. 66 Cases involving these union-preserving aspects of federalism tend to receive less attention than those addressing the breadth of Congress's legislative authority. They are often fact specific, turning on the precise scope or purpose of the state or federal laws at issue, and typically do not address broad constitutional principles. 67 Still, the overall trajectory of these decisions is quite important to the federal-state balance-perhaps even more important to the underlying values of federalism than the high-profile cases involving the limits on Congress's enumerated powers, such as Lopez, Printz, Consider the most pervasive of these limitations on state power, the doctrine of preemption. So long as Congress acts within its enumerated powers, it can displace state law addressing the same subject, and it can do so in express or implied terms." The fields regulated by the federal government have grown dramatically over the last century, such that federal law now reaches into almost every corner of national life. From crime to occupational safety to environmental protection, federal law governs private conduct that was generally subject only to state control for the nation's first 150 years. 69 Granted, some of the Rehnquist Court's decisions have narrowed the breadth of Congress's legislative powers. But they have done so only at the margins; Congress can still regulate any activity that is economic or commercial in nature, as well as a good deal of activity that is not. 7°T hus, in a post-New Deal, post-Great Society world, the vast majority of human activity in the United States can be regulated by both the federal government and the states. Consequently, the frequency with which the Supreme Court concludes that federal statutes have displaced state law within this expansive realm of concurrent jurisdiction is critical to the breadth and significance of the states' residuary powers. To cite only a few recent examples, it determines the states' leeway to regulate the practices of health maintenance organizations; 7 Preemption also pulls the relevant decisionmaking process further away from the affected citizens, eliminating the solutions reached by state and local communities and placing control of the issue in Washington.
55.
6 Moreover, to the extent vibrant state autonomy operates as an important check on tyranny, preemption undermines this objective by centralizing more control over public policy in one government.
77
Hence, if we want a complete picture of a justice's approach to federalism, we need to look beyond the decisions addressing the limits of Congress's powers. We should also consider those cases involving the various union-preserving provisions and doctrines that constrain state authority in areas where federal and state regulatory powers overlap. 8 Id. at 131 ("Doctrines limiting federal preemption of state law.., go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care about federalism in the first place.").
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
[44:3 suggested, these cases arguably present the "true test" of a justice's commitment to state policymaking autonomy within the modern framework of federalism. 79
IV. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S VOTING RECORD IN FEDERALISM CASES
A. Study Design
The purpose of this study is to test the descriptive accuracy of the common assumption that Justice O'Connor tended to favor the interests of the states in cases involving constitutional federalism. My hypothesis is that, although this claim is generally correct as to cases involving the federalism-based limits on the national government, it does not accurately characterize O'Connor's behavior in cases implicating the structural limits on the states. 80 Because my hypothesis is purely descriptive, testing it only required a statistical summary rather than regression or some other tool designed to derive descriptive or causal inferences. 81 To test this hypothesis, I created a unique data set. 82 What makes it distinctive is that it includes the full population of federalism decisions handed down by the Supreme Court during Justice O'Connor's tenure-every case implicating a structural 79.
Justice Breyer's full statement reads as follows: "[11n today's world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress' commerce power at the edges, or to protect a State's treasury from a private damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law." Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) The cases included in the study were identified in the following manner: " First, I conducted searches in Westlaw's Supreme Court database (SCT) searching for references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or doctrines in the headnotes of opinions. Thus, I ran queries such as "he("eleventh amendment")," "he(preempt!)," and "he ("commerce clause")" for each of the relevant provisions or doctrines. * Second, I read the text of each opinion generated by these queries to determine whether the Court's holding-its ultimate legal judgment in the case-addressed the provision or doctrine queried. In many cases it did not, as the opinion simply referred to the relevant doctrine for other reasons, such as to draw an analogy. Such cases were excluded from the study universe. * Third, my research assistant conducted searches in the Lexis-Nexis Supreme Court database (U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers' Edition) searching for references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or doctrines in the full text of opinions. For instance, he ran the queries "(eleventh OR 11th) w/3 amendment" and "(tenth OR 10th) w/3 amendment." " Fourth, my research assistant then read these opinions and excluded those whose holdings were clearly unrelated to the queried constitutional provisions or doctrines, erring on the side of inclusion. " Fifth, after my research assistant compiled lists of decisions involving the various provisions and doctrines, I compared these lists to those that I generated using Westlaw. I read all of the cases on my research assistant's lists that did not appear on my lists.
"
Finally, I added to the study universe those cases discovered by my research assistant that I had not found in Westlaw in which the Court's holding directly addressed the queried provision or doctrine. 84.
Every case included in the study universe is listed in this Article's appendix, infra, separated by the constitutional provision or doctrine at issue and presented in reverse chronological order. Admittedly, this universe excludes a number of decisions in which the justices' views on federalism and state autonomy were relevant to the outcomes. For example, as discussed above, the Court on several occasions has invoked federalism principles in cases of statutory interpretation outside the context of preemption. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) , for instance, the Court rejected the Corps's interpretation of the Clean Water Act-which extended the Act's coverage to nonnavigable, intrastate waters-on the ground that it raised "significant constitutional and federalism questions" as to the breadth of Congress's commerce power. Id. at 173-74. It is no coincidence that the five justices adopting this construction of the statute were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, and that the four dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The justices' underlying views about the breadth of Congress's commerce power plainly shaped their readings of the statute.
But expanding the scope of the study beyond these parameters would present a number of methodological complications. To state the obvious, virtually every issue of constitutional law has some ramifications for the breadth of the states' policymaking autonomy. In the area of criminal procedure, for instance, the dramatic expansion of the HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:3 coded the justices' votes as either favoring or disfavoring the 85 outcome that enhanced state autonomy. Another important characteristic of the study is that it is structured to capture Justice O'Connor's relative commitment to state autonomy. 6 Specifically, it compares her votes to those of the other eight justices who sat in precisely the same universe of federalism cases. As a result, all of the potentially relevant independent variables-the various legal texts and precedent, the preferences of other institutional actors, the policy consequences of the different outcomes, the quality of the parties' advocacy, etc.-are held constant. In a sense, the methodology employs a form of matching: given identical case stimuli, how does Justice O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases compare to that of her colleagues? My central premise is that, if O'Connor deserves her reputation, she should have voted for rights afforded to criminal defendants as a matter of federal constitutional law over the last fifty years has-for better or worse-substantially curtailed the states' freedom to experiment and resolve these questions as they see A potential solution would be to include those cases in which the federalism issues seemed sufficiently salient, but it would be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to devise selection criteria that would be both objective and meaningful. And absent such objective criteria for defining the universe, the study would violate the critical standard of replication. On the importance of empirical work adhering to the replication standardensuring that "another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce the research without any additional information from the author"-see Epstein & King, supra note 81, at 38.
85. The complete data set, in Microsoft Excel format, and accompanying codebook are available for download at: http://claranet.scu.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=1902.
86. Merely tabulating the percentage of her votes that enhanced state autonomy would tell us precious little. For instance, as the summary in Part III.B shows, O'Connor voted for the outcome enhancing state autonomy in 48% of the cases involving the federalism-based limits on the states. By itself, though, this does not demonstrate whether O'Connor tended to support state autonomy, tended to oppose it, or was ambivalent about it. Needless to say, a host of other variables or influences could have affected her votes in the remaining 52% of the cases, all of which might be fully consistent with a number of different attitudes about state autonomy. More to the point, the raw figure of 48% would mean something quite different depending on the context of her colleagues' behavior. If the other justices who sat in the same cases cast only 20% of their votes in favor of state autonomy, O'Connor would look like a strong ally of the states; but if 70% of her colleagues' votes in those cases favored the states, O'Connor would instead appear quite hostile to state autonomy. outcomes favoring state autonomy at a higher rate than the average of the other justices voting in the same cases.
The study covers two distinct, overlapping time frames. The first is Justice O'Connor's entire twenty-four-plus terms on the Court, from September 1981 to January 2006. Over this period, comparisons of O'Connor's record to those of other individual justices are fairly complicated, so I instead compared her votes to the cumulative average of the other justices with whom she served. The second time period is October 1994 to July 2005. I include this as a distinct frame of reference because the same nine justices served together for these eleven terms. The fortuity of this longserving "natural court" allows us to compare O'Connor's federalism record to that of other specific justices in a large universe of decisions. 8 It is worth noting that, because the study aims to describe the justices' behavior by tallying their votes favoring one outcome or another, it suffers from the same shortcomings as other 87 88. For every case in the universe, I coded the vote of each justice as either (1) enhancing state autonomy or (2) reducing it. In most instances, this was simple. Nevertheless, three issues are worth mentioning. First, nine cases presented two separate federalism issues that addressed distinct constitutional provisions or doctrines. For example, in Morrison, the Court addressed two questions: (a) whether the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act was within Congress's commerce power, and (b) whether it was valid legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) . In cases like this, I treated the justices' positions on the two issues as two separate votes (and coded each as 1 or 2). Thus, the study includes 246 votes cast by O'Connor, although she participated in only 237 cases. Because the various issues presented in these cases were largely independent, treating them as separate votes seemed the best reflection of the justices' behavior.
Second, some cases presented multiple claims raised under the same constitutional provision or doctrine. In several preemption cases, for example, the Court addressed whether a variety of state law actions were preempted by federal law. In these cases, I treated a justice's split vote-typically, a vote that one claim was preempted while another one was not-as half of a vote for each outcome and coded it as 3. This follows the protocol of another recent empirical study of the Rehnquist Court's voting patterns in preemption cases. See Greve & Klick, supra note 80, at 94. This is essentially an arbitrary judgment, but treating each claim within a preemption case as a separate case risked distorting the results through an overpopulation of preemption votes.
Finally, some cases defied simple classification as to the constitutional provision at issue. For instance, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court held that Congress had not validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity from private suits for damages because Title I of the ADA was not valid Section Five legislation. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) . One might deem this either an Eleventh Amendment decision or a Section Five decision, but including it in both would doublecount a single vote. Thus, I simply assigned these cases to one category or the other. In this instance, I classified Garrett and similar decisions as Section Five cases. Such judgments about categorization are only matters of form, as the study ultimately combines Eleventh Amendment and Section Five cases under the broader heading of federalism decisions involving the limits on the national government. studies employing similar vote-counting, outcome-focused methodologies. 8 9 First, it ignores what the justices have actually written in their opinions. And at the Supreme Court of the United States, the content of the opinions can be more important than whether the judgment under review was affirmed, reversed, or vacated." Second, it places equal weight on each decision, even though some cases are clearly more significant than others. 9 S. 549 (1995) , holding for the first time in sixty years that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause, seems a more important data point in measuring the justices' respective views on federalism than the Court's unanimous decision in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998) . In Deep Sea Research, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over in rem admiralty actions when the state does not possess the property at issue. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 495. Again, one could try to weigh the cases according to some assessment of their relative significance, but doing so would raise the same issue of replication discussed earlier. By not doing so, though, we obviously sacrifice a finer grained appreciation of the importance of the justices' various votes.
But these weaknesses should not be overstated. Outcomes may be a rather "crude measure" of the Court's decisional output, 92 but they can still tell us a great deal about patterns of judicial behavior. After all, the outcome a justice supports in a given case is often the single most revealing piece of information about her views on the issue. Moreover, focusing on outcomes allows us to record the justices' positions quite objectively, reducing the potential for bias in our data collection. Of course, outcome-based studies cannot answer all of the interesting questions we have about judicial decisionmaking, 9 3 but they can constitute a significant part of the mix of methodological tools that shed light on the Court's behavior. O'Connor participated in 236 federalism decisions, casting 250 distinct votes. Roughly twenty percent of these votes were in cases addressing the structural limits on the national government's power. As Table 1 illustrates, O'Connor's voting record in these cases was entirely consistent with her popular reputation as a strong supporter of the states' independent sovereignty and autonomy: she voted to invalidate the action of the national government at roughly twice the rate of her colleagues over the course of her tenure on the Court. These differences are statistically significant at the P=.01 level. 96. One might dispute exactly how much statistical significance matters with respect to the various figures presented in this study. Because the study includes the entire universe of federalism decisions during Justice O'Connor's tenure on the Court, the differences between her voting record and the various reference groups are descriptively true, regardless of their statistical significance. But a test of statistical significance-here, a difference of proportions test-helps assure us that the difference is not simply the idiosyncratic result of the particular mix of cases that came before the Court while O'Connor was a justice.
The following formulas are used to demonstrate the statistical significance of the differences between two proportions. The standard deviation of the difference (SD) is the square root of ((P, x (1 -P)) + N) + (P. x (1 -P) ) + N) where P, is the first proportion, P, is the second proportion, N, is the number of trials (or votes) out of which P, All other justices combined
The picture is quite different, however, in federalism cases involving the structural limits on state authority. During her tenure on the Court, O'Connor participated in 182 cases in which a state law was challenged on federalism grounds, yielding 193 distinct votes. As Table 2 shows, O'Connor's voting record with respect to state autonomy was essentially identical to the average voting records of her colleagues. If anything, she was slightly less protective of state autonomy than her colleagues, though these differences are not statistically significant. 9 7 is a proportion, and N, is the number of trials (or votes) out of which P, is a proportion. The Z-score for the difference equals (P, -P) -SD. At the P=.05 level of confidence (where there is a 95% chance that the difference in the proportions is not the result of random chance), Z=1.96. Thus, a Z-score of 1.96 or higher means statistical significance at the level of P=.05. At the P=.01 level of confidence (where there is a 99% chance that the difference in the proportions is not the result of random chance), Z=2.58. Thus, a Z-score of 2.58 or higher means statistical significance at the P=.01 level. See David S. Moore, THE BASic PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 504-07, 521-24 (4th ed. 2007).
In Table 1 , the Z-score for the difference in all decisions (65% versus 35%) was 4.474. The Z-score for the difference in non-unanimous decisions (88% versus 45%) was 7.355. Because both of these Z-scores exceed 1.96, the differences are statistically significant.
97.
In all decisions, the Z-score for the difference (47.15% versus 47.39%) was 0.0629. In non-unanimous decisions, the Z-score for the difference (43.98% versus 45.12%) was 0.2246. Because both Z-scores fall below 1.96, the differences are not statistically significant.
October 1994 to July 2005.
The same dichotomous pattern holds for O'Connor's last eleven terms on the Court, though her record in the union-preserving federalism cases is even more intriguing. From October 1994 to July 2005, the Court decided twenty-five cases involving the limits on Congress's enumerated powers, yielding twenty-seven distinct voting opportunities for the justices. As Figure 1 shows, the voting patterns in these cases conform to the common perception of the Rehnquist Court: Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas typically voted to invalidate the assertion of federal authority at issue, while Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer typically dissented. 98 The Court's polarization is clearer when we limit our review to its non-unanimous decisions. In these seventeen cases,
98.
The differences between O'Connor's voting record in these cases and those of Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer are statistically significant at the P=.O1 level. The differences between O'Connor's voting record and those of Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas are not statistically significant. involving the Constitution's union-preserving federalism provisions-its structural limits on the states-she was no more inclined to "let them try things" than the average justice with whom she served.
If O'Connor was not quite the ardent proponent of state autonomy that many have presumed, are there alternative descriptions that capture her behavior in federalism cases? Developing a full-blown theory of O'Connor's approach to federalism goes beyond the scope of this Article. But let me at least suggest a line of inquiry-one that would be fully consistent with the priorities of the Republican Party of the late twentieth century that propelled O'Connor onto the Court.°4
Instead of simply seeing federalism cases as presenting a choice between more or less state autonomy, we might alternatively conceptualize them as presenting choices about the extent of government regulation generally. Whether they involve the breadth of Congress's enumerated powers or the unionpreserving limits on the states, at stake are limits on the government's power to regulate. Of course, when the Court holds that that a state law has been preempted-and even when it concludes that a state law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause-federal regulation of the same activity usually remains in place.' But a judgment invalidating the state law necessarily reduces the aggregate level and stringency of the regulation of that activity. In other words, every federalism case presents some version of a choice between more or less regulation.
From this perspective, we can derive an alternative characterization of O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases: a general disposition towards reducing government regulation, regardless of its source.'° Consider again Justice O'Connor's 148 votes in non-unanimous federalism cases over her twenty-four-
104.
Cross, Smith, & Tomarchio, supra note 89, at 3 (observing that, during his 1980 presidential election campaign, Ronald Reagan strongly criticized the liberal decisions of the Warren Court, arguing "that the judiciary had lost its grounding in originalism and restraint," and that, following his election, he was committed to appointing conservative judges).
105. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (invalidating an Illinois state law because of the burden on interstate commerce, but promoting the Williams Act, a federal law regulating similar activity to a lesser degree).
106. Others, such as Frank Cross and Richard Fallon-taking a bluntly political view of the Rehnquist Court's behavior-have attributed the deregulatory valence to aspects of the Court's federalism project. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1322-24 (describing the deregulatory nature of the Rehnquist Court's 1999 federalism decisions that limited the legislative authority of Congress); Fallon, supra note 14, at 470-71 (positing that "the substantive conservatism of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy" may well lead "them to view the Commerce Clause as embodying antiregulatory, procompetitive ideals").
plus terms on the Court: sixty-three percent of those votes favored a reduction in government regulation, while the average among the other justices sitting in the same cases was fifty-two percent. Thus, her distance from the average voting record of the other justices was the same along the dimensions of greater state autonomy and less government regulation-she voted for outcomes that enhanced state autonomy, as well as those that reduced the stringency of government regulation, at a rate eleven percent higher than her colleagues. 0 7 The deregulatory nature of O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases was especially pronounced in her last eleven full terms on the Court. She cast more than three-fourths of her votes in non-unanimous decisions during these terms to invalidate the regulation at issue, whether the regulation emanated from the federal government or the states. 08 For this period, O'Connor's voting record was the single most hostile on the Court to government regulation in federalism cases.
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Both of these differences of 11% are statistically significant at the P=.05 level. For the difference between O'Connor and all other justices in the rate of voting to invalidate the regulation at issue (63% versus 52%) Another way to explore the question is to confine our review to those federalism decisions addressing the legality of laws, regulations, or common law liability rules imposed on private businesses. Because Congress's authority to regulate economic or commercial activity is essentially unquestioned, these decisions all involved the legality of state or local regulations."° As a result, each decision in this category presented a choice between an outcome favoring state policymaking autonomy and an outcome favoring less stringent regulation of private business. And these cases reveal the same basic pattern. Over the course of her entire career, Justice O'Connor voted for the outcome favoring state autonomy (45.9%, N=159) Again, these data do not support the causal inference that O'Connor voted as she did because of a preference to reduce government regulation. A number of other variables might have influenced her behavior in federalism cases: her responsiveness to the position taken by the Solicitor General; her sense of public opinion or the preferences of Congress, the President, or lower court judges; her situational relationship with her colleagues and her role in their group dynamic; or her policy preferences along dimensions other than state autonomy or business regulation. 
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The differences between O'Connor's voting record on this score and those of Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Souter, are Testing the significance of such influences would require a multiple regression that incorporated, to the extent feasible, each of these variables and perhaps others.
Still, the data presented here are revealing in two important ways. First, O'Connor's tendency to support state autonomythough greater than the average justice-was only evident in cases involving the limits on the federal government; she was no more protective of state autonomy than the average of her colleagues in cases involving the structural limits on the states. Second, in the full run of federalism cases, O'Connor voted as frequently to reduce regulation or regulatory authority as she did to enhance state policymaking autonomy, and she did so much more frequently over her last eleven full terms on the Court. This was especially true in cases presenting a dichotomous choice between an outcome that enhanced state autonomy and one that reduced government regulation. exercises independent judgment on a case-by-case basis, its general ideological direction is shaped by political developments external to the Court. Constitutional development is more the product of shifts in the governing national coalition than the occasion of the justices finally being won over by particular legal arguments. Thus, the Court is best conceived as an integral policymaking partner of the ascendant political majority, or at least as an influential segment of that majority.
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Regime politics theory is probably better suited to explain the behavior of the Court as a whole than the actions of a single justice. But Justice O'Connor's voting record in federalism cases certainly appears to resemble the political priorities of the conservative movement that gave rise to her career. While the Republican Party of the last thirty years has often emphasized the importance of the independent sovereignty of the states, it has generally done so by advocating for enforcement of the structural limits on Congress's authority and for a reduction of the size of the federal government. 6 To be sure, GOP thought on the subject has not been monolithic, and those genuinely committed to state autonomy have achieved some policy successes, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995." But the modern Republican Party as a whole has never embraced a broader constitutional program to substantially enhance the legislative autonomy of the states." 8 This seems especially true in Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511, 511, 515-19 (2007) (book review) (identifying contemporary political scientists studying regime politics in order to understand the influence of majority power on judicial behavior).
115. There are two principal mechanisms by which this might occur. First, the President and the Senate select justices based largely on their ideology, ensuring that the justices' substantive views will tend to reflect those of the dominant coalition at the time of their nominations. Second, regardless of the views that they take to the bench, the Court as an institution is substantially constrained by the preferences of the contemporary Congress and President. Without the sword or the purse, the justices must be cognizant-consciously or unconsciously--of the views of the extant political regime in making their decisions. Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 131, 138 ("Lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Supreme Court must make sure that its decisions are acceptable to the American people and their elected officials. Otherwise, the Court risks a political backlash-one that will almost certainly undo any doctrinal innovations that it might pursue.").
116. (2000)).
118. For instance, consider such Republican-sponsored initiatives as the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2000)) (ensuring that no requirement exists for a state to give effect to the same sex relationships legitimized under the laws of another state); No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 , Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § § 6301 et seq. (2006)) (establishing federal law with respect to the administration the area of commercial regulation. Consider such GOP initiatives as the decades-long effort to enact federal tort reform legislation, recently resulting in the Class Action Fairness Act;' 19 the inclusion of express preemption clauses in numerous Republicansponsored statutes; 0 and the use of agency rulemaking by the present Bush Administration to preempt wide swaths of state law, 121 just to name a few. Justice O'Connor plainly cared about federalism, and she believed strongly in the judicial enforcement of the structural limits on the national government. But, more generally, her voting record in cases involving the federalism-based constraints on state governments did not reveal a particular concern for state policymaking autonomy. Like the political coalition that placed her on the Court-or at least an influential aspect of that coalition-she tended to favor outcomes that enhanced state autonomy but to no greater degree than she favored outcomes that reduced the stringency of government regulation. In this way, she appears to have reflected the priorities of the modem Republican Party. Given O'Connor's place as the median justice on a Republican-dominated Court, this is entirely unsurprising.
